The Effect of Auditor Reporting Choice and Audit Committee Oversight Strength on Management Financial Disclosure Decisions by Fuller, Stephen
Georgia State University
ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University
Accountancy Dissertations School of Accountancy
5-2015
The Effect of Auditor Reporting Choice and Audit
Committee Oversight Strength on Management
Financial Disclosure Decisions
Stephen Fuller
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/accountancy_diss
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Accountancy at ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Accountancy Dissertations by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. For more
information, please contact scholarworks@gsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Fuller, Stephen, "The Effect of Auditor Reporting Choice and Audit Committee Oversight Strength on Management Financial
Disclosure Decisions." Dissertation, Georgia State University, 2015.
https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/accountancy_diss/16
i 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
PERMISSION TO BORROW 
 
 
 
In presenting this dissertation as a partial fulfillment of the requirements for an advanced 
degree from Georgia State University, I agree that the Library of the University shall 
make it available for inspection and circulation in accordance with its regulations 
governing materials of this type.  I agree that permission to quote from, to copy from, or 
publish this dissertation may be granted by the author or, in his absence, the professor 
under whose direction it was written or, in her absence, by the Dean of the Robinson 
College of Business.  Such quoting, copying, or publishing must be solely for scholarly 
purposes and must not involve potential financial gain.  It is understood that any copying 
from or publication of this dissertation which involves potential gain will not be allowed 
without written permission of the author. 
 
 
 
Stephen H. Fuller 
  
ii 
 
      
 
 
 
 
NOTICE TO BORROWERS 
 
 
 
All dissertations deposited in the Georgia State University Library must be used only in 
accordance with the stipulations prescribed by the author in the preceding statement. 
 
The author of this dissertation is: 
 
Stephen H. Fuller 
School of Accountancy  
J. Mack Robinson College of Business  
Georgia State University  
35 Broad Street NW  
Atlanta, GA 30303  
  
 
The director of this dissertation is: 
 
Dr. Jennifer R. Joe 
Whitney Family Professor of Accounting 
University of Delaware 
Department of Accounting & MIS 
212 Purnell Hall 
Newark, DE 19716  
  
iii 
 
      
 
 
 
THE EFFECT OF AUDITOR REPORTING CHOICE AND AUDIT 
COMMITTEE OVERSIGHT STRENGTH ON MANAGEMENT FINANCIAL 
DISCLOSURE DECISIONS 
 
BY 
 
 
STEPHEN H. FULLER 
 
 
A Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree 
 
Of 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
In the Robinson College of Business 
 
Of 
 
Georgia State University 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY 
ROBINSON COLLEGE OF BUSINESS 
2015 
iv 
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright by 
STEPHEN H. FULLER 
2015 
  
v 
 
      
 
 
ACCEPTANCE 
 
This dissertation was prepared under the direction of STEPHEN H. FULLER’S 
Dissertation Committee.  It has been approved and accepted by all members of that 
committee, and it has been accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the 
degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Business Administration in the J. Mack Robinson 
College of Business of Georgia State University. 
 
 
 Richard D. Phillips, Dean 
 
 
DISSERTATION COMMITTEE 
 
Dr. Jennifer Joe (chair) 
Dr. Kathryn Kadous 
Dr. Lisa Lambert 
Dr. Benjamin Luippold 
Dr. Ivo Tafkov 
vi 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
I am very grateful for the wisdom and support provided by the members of my 
dissertation committee: Jennifer Joe (Chair), Kathryn Kadous, Lisa Lambert, Benjamin 
Luippold and Ivo Tafkov.  My dissertation benefited greatly from their patient guidance 
and commitment to excellence in research.  I would also like to thank Lynn Hannan and 
Larry Brown for their mentorship and instrumental contributions to my doctoral 
education. 
 
In addition, I gratefully acknowledge the many parties who have provided assistance and 
feedback over the course of my dissertation including Christopher Agoglia, Ellen Best, 
Carol Bishop, Nerissa Brown, Kerri-Ann Gooden-Sanderson, Yoon Ju Kang, Siva 
Nathan, Usha Ramachandran, Galen Sevcik, Doug Stevens, Han Stice, Laura Swenson, 
Roger White, and all of the Georgia State University faculty, staff and doctoral students.  
I am especially grateful to the many professionals who kindly shared their valuable time 
and experience for my study. 
 
Finally, I am deeply grateful to all of my family and friends who provided endless 
support over the course of my doctoral program.  Most of all, I thank my wonderful 
parents, Harold and Mary Fuller, who gave me love and encouragement and stressed the 
importance of education and hard work all of my life. 
  
vii 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
ABSTRACT ix 
  
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 1 
  
CHAPTER II: BACKGROUND AND THEORY 6 
     2.1 Prior Research on Management Disclosure Choice 6 
     2.2 PCAOB Project 7 
     2.3 Audit Committee’s Role in Financial Reporting 11 
     2.4 Hypothesis Development 13 
            2.4.1 Effect of Auditor Reporting of CAMs on Management Disclosure 13 
            2.4.2 Moderating Effect of Audit Committee Oversight Strength 15 
  
CHAPTER III: METHOD 18 
     3.1 Participants 18 
     3.2 Design 20 
            3.2.1 Independent Variables 20 
            3.2.2 Experimental Materials and Task 22 
            3.2.3 Dependent Variables 23 
            3.2.4 Procedures 25 
  
CHAPTER IV: RESULTS 26 
     4.1 Manipulation Checks 26 
     4.2 Hypothesis Tests 27 
     4.3 Supplemental Analysis 29 
            4.3.1 Comparisons of CAM Conditions 29 
            4.3.2 Disclosure Element Ratings 32 
     4.4 Discussion 34 
  
CHAPTER V: CONCLUSION 35 
  
REFERENCES 38 
  
APPENDICES 43 
     Appendix A – Audit Committee Description 43 
     Appendix B – Auditor Reporting Choice 44 
     Appendix C – Examples of Disclosure Elements 45 
  
 
 
  
viii 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued) 
 
FIGURES 46 
     Figure 1 – Predicted Pattern of Results – All Conditions 46 
     Figure 2 – Flow of Experiment 46 
     Figure 3 – Actual Pattern of Results – All Conditions 47 
     Figure 4 – Actual Pattern of Results – No CAM and Long CAM Conditions 47 
     Figure 5 – Actual Pattern of Results – Short CAM and Long CAM  
                       Conditions 
47 
     Figure 6 – Actual Pattern of Results for H2 – No CAM and Short CAM 
                       Conditions 
48 
  
TABLES 48 
     Table 1 – Demographic Information 48 
     Table 2 – Rating of Extent of Disclosure – All Treatment Conditions 49 
     Table 3 – Rating of Extent of Disclosure – Comparison of No CAM and 
                     Long CAM conditions 
50 
     Table 4 – Rating of Extent of Disclosure – Comparison of Short CAM and  
                     Long CAM conditions 
51 
     Table 5 – Rating of Extent of Disclosure – Comparison of No CAM and  
                     Short CAM conditions 
52 
     Table 6 – Summary of Disclosure Element Ratings – Comparison of all  
                     CAM conditions 
53 
     Table 7 – Summary of Disclosure Element Ratings – Comparison of No 
                     CAM and Long CAM conditions 
54 
     Table 8 – Summary of Disclosure Element Ratings – Comparison of Short  
                     CAM and Long CAM conditions 
55 
     Table 9 – Summary of Disclosure Element Ratings – Comparison of No  
                     CAM and Short CAM conditions 
56 
  
 
 
 
 
  
ix 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
THE EFFECT OF AUDITOR REPORTING CHOICE AND AUDIT 
COMMITTEE OVERSIGHT STRENGTH ON MANAGEMENT  
FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE DECISIONS 
 
BY 
 
STEPHEN H. FULLER 
 
DECEMBER 2014 
 
 
Committee Chair: Dr. Jennifer Joe 
 
Major Academic Unit: School of Accounting 
 
Motivated by the current PCAOB proposed standard regarding expansion of the auditor’s 
reporting model, this study investigates the effect of auditor reporting choice on 
management disclosure decisions.  The proposed standard would require auditors to 
identify and provide information about the most significant audit and financial reporting 
issues encountered during the audit in a new section of the audit report on Critical Audit 
Matters (CAMs).    I develop theory to predict how auditor choices about reporting on 
CAMs might affect manager disclosure decisions.  In addition, the study investigates how 
the effect of auditor reporting choice on management disclosure decisions depends on a 
very important governance structure, the audit committee.  I find that management reacts 
to the auditor shining a spotlight on a highly uncertain critical accounting estimate by 
increasing their own disclosure of the matter and that this effect varies directly with the 
strength of the audit committee’s oversight.  In addition, I find that as auditors increase 
the level of detail provided by the auditor in its CAM reporting, management responds 
with increased disclosure.  Finally, when the auditor provides a detailed CAM discussion, 
it appears that managers are likely to increase disclosure of quantitative information that 
would enhance the financial statement user’s ability to quantify the risk in a critical 
accounting estimate.  The study provides ex ante insights on how a mandated change in 
the auditor’s reporting model might affect the level of information provided by 
management and received by investors. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This study examines how managers’ decisions to disclose information about critical 
accounting estimates might be sensitive to whether auditors bring attention to the estimates with 
their reporting choices.  Investors and regulators contend that auditors have information about 
their clients’ financial reporting that investors are demanding (PCAOB 2011b), but that 
management is choosing not to disclose (SEC 2003, PCAOB 2011b).  The importance of this 
issue to investors was highlighted by the failure of financial sector companies to make adequate 
disclosure regarding the uncertainty surrounding fair value, which some contend was a major 
contributing factor to the global financial crisis experienced in the late 2000s (PCAOB 2011a).  
To explore the issue, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) initiated a 
project in 2011 addressing how the current auditor’s reporting model might be modified to 
provide information of greater value to investors (PCAOB 2011a).  Highly debated changes to 
the auditor’s reporting model have been proposed that would require auditors to bring heightened 
attention to key areas of uncertainty in the financial statements such as critical accounting 
estimates.  It is important to shed light on how managers might respond to differing levels of 
attention brought by auditors to critical accounting estimates by adjusting their own voluntary 
disclosure decisions.   
Effects of the proposed auditing standard are likely to be influenced by the corporate 
governance environment of the firm.  Audit committees are a key element of corporate 
governance by virtue of their role in the monitoring of financial reporting (Blue Ribbon 
Committee 1999; Agoglia et al. 2011).  Prior research has consistently found that stronger audit 
committees are associated with higher quality financial reporting (Agoglia et al. 2011; Abbott et 
al. 2004; Bédard et al. 2004).  In the course of the debate over the PCAOB auditor’s reporting 
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model project, many audit committee members voiced concerns that expanding the auditor’s 
reporting model might have the effect of usurping the audit committee’s responsibility for 
investor protection (PCAOB 2011b).  However, audit committee oversight is likely to play a 
pivotal role in determining how proposed changes to the auditor’s reporting model translate to 
changes in the quality of management’s financial disclosure.  Audit committees review financial 
statements and the auditor’s report prior to their release (Beasley et al. 2009), and management 
must consider the audit committee’s reaction to the content of the auditor report.  Management’s 
sensitivity to the auditor’s reporting choices likely depends on the level of accountability felt by 
management to the audit committee.  Therefore, I also test whether the impact of the proposed 
standard on management disclosure choice is conditional on the strength of the audit 
committee’s oversight. 
The financial reporting and auditing of critical accounting estimates is an area that has 
received widespread attention in recent years due to the importance of these estimates to the 
content of financial statements and to the decisions of investors (Griffith et al. 2014).  Critical 
accounting estimates frequently involve complex estimations and computations which require 
significant management judgment (Griffith et al. 2014).  The use of critical accounting estimates 
is pervasive in many financial reporting settings including fair value reporting, asset impairment 
analysis, product warranty and liability reserves and post-employment benefits (Griffith et al. 
2014).   Due to the uncertainty and subjectivity surrounding critical accounting estimates, there 
has been a consistent call by regulators and the markets for management to provide disclosure 
complementary to the financial statement presentation to improve financial reporting 
transparency (e.g., SEC 2003, PCAOB 2011b).  Unfortunately, the broad disclosure of 
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uncertainty regarding critical accounting estimates has not been universally forthcoming (SEC 
2003; PCAOB 2011b).   
The audit process represents an avenue for improving clients’ compliance with the 
current SEC regulations regarding disclosure on critical accounting estimates for several reasons.  
First, auditors interact with their clients on financial reporting matters as a matter of routine.  
This relationship allows auditors to keep abreast of developments in the critical accounting areas 
of their clients on a timely basis.  Next, if changes contemplated in the proposed standard are 
adopted, some stakeholders feel that the expansion of the audit report will provide auditors with 
greater leverage to compel clients to provide improved disclosure of critical accounting issues 
(PCAOB 2011b).  Finally, the PCAOB, by virtue of their inspection powers over audit firms, can 
properly motivate the audit firms to make appropriate judgments concerning what client issues 
are most important to cover in the expanded audit report (Carcello et al. 2011). 
In August 2013, the PCAOB released a proposed auditing standard dealing with the 
auditor’s reporting model which required that auditors include in their audit report a section 
dealing with “Critical Audit Matters” (CAMs) which “involved the most difficult, subjective, or 
complex auditor judgments or posed the most difficulty to the auditor in obtaining sufficient 
appropriate audit evidence or forming an opinion on the financial statements” (PCAOB 2013, 
6).1  Under the proposed standard, the auditor would be required to disclose information about 
                                                     
1 The PCAOB project had previously proposed different options for expanding the auditor’s reporting model.  Each 
of the options provided the potential for auditors to bring increased attention to the area of critical accounting 
estimates.  The options initially proposed in the project included (i) a new report called the “Auditor’s Discussion 
and Analysis” (ADA), (ii) extension of the audit report to cover certain “information outside the financial 
statements” or (iii) “required and expanded use of emphasis paragraphs” (PCAOB 2011a, 12).  Eventually, a 
consensus began to develop among the various stakeholders in the debate around the option involving emphasis of 
matter (EOM) paragraphs (PCAOB 2011b, 2012).  The CAM approach in the most recent proposal is based directly 
on the EOM approach. 
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each CAM in a new section of the audit report or to state that there are no CAMs (PCAOB 
2013).  While auditors would be required under the proposed standard to begin reporting on 
CAMs, they would still have broad discretion over the level of detailed information provided.  In 
the course of the debate over expansion of the audit report, auditors have indicated they would 
only be supportive of providing factual and objective information (PCAOB 2011b).  Other 
constituencies in the debate argued that if auditors provide only limited information and mainly 
rely on reference to management disclosure, the change would not provide investors with the 
information they are demanding (PCAOB 2011b).  Therefore, I explore whether the level of 
detail provided in the auditor’s reporting on the CAM impacts the manager’s decision to provide 
disclosure of information that investors are demanding.   
To address my research questions, I conducted an experiment in which participants were 
highly experienced public company financial executives, primarily chief financial officers.  This 
high caliber group of participants was vital given the importance of obtaining reliable ex ante 
insights on the proposal from managers that will be directly impacted by the proposed standard. 
Participants rated the extent of disclosure they would choose to make related to a critical 
accounting estimate made by a hypothetical company as well as the importance of a variety of 
specific disclosure elements.  I manipulated the auditor reporting choice regarding an accounting 
estimate made by the company at three levels: (i) No CAM (control); (ii) Short CAM with a brief 
description in the audit report; or (iii) Long CAM with a detailed description in the audit report.  
I also manipulated the strength of the audit committee’s oversight at two levels, moderate and 
strong.  Based on theory grounded in the economics and psychology literatures, I predicted 
increases in the level of detail provided in the auditor’s CAM reporting of an issue would lead to 
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increased disclosure by managers, with the strongest effect coming in the presence of strong 
audit committee oversight. 
Consistent with expectations, I found a joint effect of auditor CAM reporting choice and 
audit committee oversight strength on manager disclosure decisions. I found that the increase in 
the manager’s disclosure resulting from the auditor providing detailed discussion of a CAM was 
greatest in the presence of strong audit committee oversight, thus highlighting the continued 
importance of the audit committee to the quality of financial reporting.   Further, I found that 
managers did not increase their disclosure when the auditor included only cursory discussion of 
the CAM in its audit report providing support for this concern voiced by some stakeholders in 
the debate.   I also investigated the specific elements of disclosure a manager considers when 
making financial disclosure.  I found that elements of disclosure that enhance the ability of 
financial statement users to quantify the level of risk in a critical accounting estimate (e.g., range 
of, key assumptions in, and sensitivity analysis of the estimate) are more likely to be disclosed 
when the auditor increases the spotlight on a critical accounting estimate in its CAM reporting, 
and that this effect depends on the strength of the audit committee’s oversight. 
The study makes several contributions to regulators, practitioners and accounting 
researchers.  First, the study provides timely feedback to regulators and stakeholders on the 
potential effects of the proposed standard that will inform regulator decision-making.  Several 
important topics under debate are addressed in the study including the appropriate level of detail 
that should be required in the auditor’s CAM reporting and the role of the audit committee in the 
evolving financial reporting environment.  Next, the study answers the call for experimental 
research on how proposed policy changes might impact the nature and quality of financial 
reporting (Maines 1994; Beresford 1997).  Archival information in the U.S. is not available to 
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analyze the impact of the proposed change. Experimental research provides the advantage of 
seeing ex ante what might happen in a setting “as if” the change had been implemented (Maines 
1994).  While several concurrent experimental studies have begun to address the implications of 
the proposed standard, most have focused on the areas of auditor legal liability (Kachelmeier et 
al. 2014 WP; Backof et al. 2014 WP; Gimbar et al. 2014 WP; Brasel et al. 2014 WP; Brown et 
al. 2104 WP) and investor reaction to information in CAMs (Christensen et al. 2014 WP; Sirois 
et al. 2014 WP).  To my knowledge, this is the first experimental study dealing directly with the 
effect of auditor reporting choices on manager disclosure decisions.  Finally, the study extends 
the accounting literature on the impact of audit committee oversight on the quality of financial 
reporting and disclosure (Agoglia et al. 2011; Abbott et al. 2004; Bédard et al. 2004; Kang 2014 
WP). 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  Section II provides theory and 
hypothesis development, Section III describes the research design, Section IV presents the results 
of my study, and Section V concludes.   
II. BACKGROUND AND THEORY 
2.1  Prior Research on Management Disclosure Choice 
Prior research has identified several factors affecting management’s choice to make 
disclosure.  Much of this research has identified a variety of offsetting incentives influencing 
management’s disclosure choice.  On one hand, managers have a number of positive incentives 
to make greater disclosure.  For example, managers might provide higher quality disclosure to 
establish a reputation for credibility with investors (Stocken 2000; Beyer et al. 2010) for both 
themselves and the firm.  Such a reputation can grant a number of economic benefits such as 
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higher firm valuation and lower cost of capital (Beyer et al. 2010), and a reduction in litigation 
risk (Skinner 1997; Field et al. 2005; Beyer et al. 2010).   
On the other hand, managers also have incentives discouraging greater disclosure.  First, 
since a significant component of management compensation is frequently based on stock price 
performance, managers might desire to avoid, or at least postpone, disclosure of bad news to 
avoid negative stock price impacts (Beyer et al. 2010).  Second, greater disclosure has the 
potential for proprietary costs to the firm as competitors could derive information from 
disclosure that is detrimental to the firm’s interests (Fischer and Verrecchia 2004; Arya et al. 
2009; Beyer et al. 2010).   
The presence of these offsetting incentives likely motivates management to seek a level 
of disclosure that secures the greatest net benefit of disclosure after considering the costs 
incurred as a result of disclosure.  It is important to note that managers are influenced in this 
judgment by whether investors know that management has private information (Beyer et al. 
2010).  If investors are thought to know less about management’s possession of private 
information, management would be expected to provide less voluntary disclosure of bad news 
(Dye 1985; Jung and Kwon 1988; Penno 1997; Pae 2002; Beyer et al. 2010).  It is possible that 
the changes to the auditor’s reporting model currently proposed might shine a spotlight on key 
financial statement areas and inform investors that management has private information it is not 
disclosing about these areas.  Therefore, it is important to assess the impact that such changes 
might have on management’s decision what to disclose as a result. 
2.2  PCAOB Project 
In June 2011, The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) initiated a 
project to explore whether and how the current auditor’s reporting model might be modified to 
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provide information of greater value to investors (PCAOB 2011a).  Based on the PCAOB’s own 
views and outreach activities, the current auditor’s reporting model is primarily seen as a 
“pass/fail” model that simply provides reasonable assurance as to whether or not the financial 
statements are presented free of material misstatement (PCAOB 2011b).  Many investors have 
argued that auditors could provide much more useful reporting to investors if their reporting was 
expanded to provide additional information on a wide array of areas including critical accounting 
estimates and their impact on the financial statements (PCAOB 2011b, 2012).  The PCAOB 
issued a concept release on the project proposing three different methods by which expanded 
auditor reporting might be pursued: (i) the requirement of an “Auditor’s Discussion and 
Analysis” (ADA) related to the audit; (ii) extension of the audit report to cover certain 
“information outside the financial statements”; or (iii) “required and expanded use of emphasis 
paragraphs” (PCAOB 2011a, 12). 
The PCAOB conducted extensive debate related to the auditor’s reporting model project 
including all the major stakeholders – auditors, management, investors and audit committees.  
Auditors, management and the audit committee expressed many concerns about the project, chief 
among them that auditors should not be the source of “original information” about the company, 
which should remain the responsibility of management (PCAOB 2011b).  Each of these 
stakeholders largely opposed the concept of an ADA or extension of the audit report to areas 
outside the financial statements (e.g., all or part of MDA2) due to concerns about the source of 
                                                     
2 Current SEC regulations require firms to make supplemental disclosure in Management’s Discussion and Analysis 
(MDA) regarding critical accounting estimates if they are material due to their subjectivity and impact on the 
financial statements (SEC 2003).  However, despite these regulations, investors and regulators continue to assert that 
the appropriate level of disclosure is not being made (PCAOB 2011b).  At present, auditors are not generally 
required to provide assurance regarding their clients’ MDA and, accordingly, do not opine on the adequacy of the 
critical accounting estimates disclosure contained in MDA.  Instead, they are merely required in the current model to 
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company information being the auditor as well as cost and administrative burdens (PCAOB 
2011b).  Investors, however, expressed significant support for the concept of an ADA.  
Garnering somewhat more of a consensus, the proposal to expand and mandate the use of EOM 
paragraphs was the option that received the greatest support on both sides of the debate (PCAOB 
2011b, 2012). 
In August 2013, the PCAOB released a proposed auditing standard dealing with the 
auditor’s reporting model, adopting an approach similar to the EOM paragraph approach.  
Specifically, the proposed standard would require auditors to include in their audit report a 
section dealing with “Critical Audit Matters”. Pursuant to the proposed standard, CAMs consist 
of matters which “involved the most difficult, subjective, or complex auditor judgments or posed 
the most difficulty to the auditor in obtaining sufficient appropriate audit evidence or forming an 
opinion on the financial statements” (PCAOB 2013, 6).  The auditor is required to disclose 
certain information about each CAM in the audit report or to state that there were no CAMs.  For 
each CAM, the auditor must (i) "identify the critical audit matter”; (ii), “describe the 
considerations that led the auditor to determine that the matter is a critical audit matter”; and (iii) 
“refer to the relevant financial statement accounts and disclosures that relate to the critical audit 
matter, when applicable” (PCAOB 2013, 16). 
The previous debate concerning the EOM paragraph option to the expansion of the audit 
report is relevant to the proposed standard requirement for the auditor’s reporting on CAMs, 
which is very similar in concept.  In the debate, auditors generally took the position that any 
                                                     
read the client’s MDA and resolve any inconsistencies between the MDA and the audited financial statements 
(PCAOB 2003). 
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EOM paragraph should be limited to objective factual information for which auditors are not the 
original source and make reference to where the issue is discussed by management (PCAOB 
2011b) .  They further argued that merely identifying an uncertain issue in the audit report would 
likely lead to disclosures by management that were among the most complete in the financial 
statements (PCAOB 2011b). Other stakeholders (e.g., investors) in the debate took the position 
that such a limited EOM paragraph provided little or no benefit and amounted to “roadmapping” 
for financial reporting (PCAOB 2011b).  They called for greater information content in EOM 
paragraphs such as discussion of why the auditor felt it was important to emphasize the matter 
and what uncertainties applied to the area (PCAOB 2011b).  This study seeks to inform the 
debate by examining what impact reporting on CAMs might have on management disclosure 
choice when the level of detail in the auditor discussion of the CAM in the audit report is either 
basic (i.e., roadmapping) or more extensive in nature compared to a control condition where the 
critical accounting estimate is not treated as a CAM. 
Several concurrent studies explore the effect of the proposed auditing standard on various 
stakeholders in the financial reporting process.  The area most commonly researched has been 
the effect of auditor CAM reporting on assessments of auditor legal liability for misstatements in 
the client’s financial statements.  Several of these studies in a variety of specific contexts have 
found that auditor reporting of a CAM may lead to a reduced level of legal liability for auditors 
(Kachelmeier et al. 2014 WP; Brasel et al. 2014 WP; Brown et al. 2014 WP).  In other specific 
contexts, auditor reporting of a CAM was found to lead to higher auditor liability assessments 
(Gimbar et al. 2014 WP).  Another area being studied is the impact of auditor CAM reporting on 
investor decisions.  Christensen et al. (2014) find that reporting of a CAM concerning fair value 
decreased the likelihood that non-professional investors would invest in the target firm.  Sirois et 
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al. (2014) found that discussion of a “key audit matter” in the audit report led to greater 
“information search” about the matter by their graduate student proxies for non-professional 
investors.  Interestingly, they also found that participants indicated “lower perceived audit 
quality” in the areas of the audit corresponding with the key audit matter (Sirois et al. 2014 WP).  
The relevance of all of these studies to my study lies in the many different factors that bear on 
the auditor’s decision whether or not to report an audit issue as a CAM, suggesting that there 
might be significant variance in that decision. 
To my knowledge, there is no concurrent study that specifically addresses the effect of 
the proposed standard on management financial disclosure decisions.  However, there is one 
study that addresses the “communication openness” of non-financial management toward 
auditors in the presence of a CAM reporting requirement (Cade and Hodge 2014 WP).  In an 
abstract setting where non-financial management has private information that the auditor is not 
aware of concerning key accounting estimates, Cade and Hodge (2014 WP) find that non-
financial managers are less likely to openly communicate with their auditors when the auditor is 
required to report on the client’s “key accounting estimates” than when they are not.  The Cade 
and Hodge (2014 WP) study is a valuable complement to this study in the sense that it addresses 
an important precursor to the auditor’s CAM reporting decision – the ability of the auditor to 
obtain all the relevant knowledge of the issue needed to make an informed decision with regard 
to CAM reporting. 
2.3  Audit Committee’s Role in Financial Reporting 
 Audit Committees provide a critical oversight role over corporate financial reporting 
(Agoglia et al. 2011; Blue Ribbon Committee 1999; Beasley et al. 2009) which has only 
increased subsequent to the passage of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX).  SOX included a 
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number of provisions designed to strengthen audit committees and expand their oversight 
responsibilities (U.S. House of Representatives 2002).  For example, SOX requires that all audit 
committee members be independent and that companies disclose “whether or not … the audit 
committee of [the] issuer is comprised of at least [one] member who is a financial expert” (U.S. 
House of Representatives 2002) as defined by SOX (Agoglia et al. 2011).  Prior research has 
characterized stronger audit committees as being more independent, having greater financial 
expertise, and meeting more frequently (Bédard et al. 2004; Agoglia et al. 2011).  These audit 
committee characteristics have been found to lead to improvements in financial reporting quality 
(see Agoglia et al. 2011 for a review).  For instance, Agoglia et al. (2011) found experimental 
evidence that stronger audit committees constrain management exploitation of “bright-line” 
rules-based accounting standards for “opportunistic reporting”.  Abbott et al. (2004) found that 
audit committees that were more independent and met more frequently were less likely to be 
associated with accounting restatements (Agoglia et al. 2011).  In addition, Bédard et al. (2004) 
provide evidence that stronger audit committee independence and expertise reduce the likelihood 
of earnings management (Agoglia et al. 2011). 
 Prior research on audit committee oversight has also identified cross-sectional variance in 
the nature of audit committees’ approach to their oversight responsibilities.  For example, two 
different survey studies (Beasley et al. 2009; Cohen et al. 2010) addressed the audit committee 
process and explored how audit committees executed their oversight responsibilities.  Beasley et 
al. (2009) surveyed 42 audit committee members and found evidence that some audit committee 
members felt that oversight of the financial reporting process by the audit committee was 
somewhat “ceremonial” while others felt that the audit committee was deeply involved.  Cohen 
et al. (2010) surveyed 30 audit partners and managers about their perceptions of audit committee 
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oversight.  In their survey, only 52% of the respondents indicated that the audit committee 
impacted the “resolution of contentious” accounting and reporting matters between management 
and auditors. 
 The relationship between audit committee oversight strength and financial reporting 
quality can be explained by management’s accountability to the audit committee.  The 
psychology literature identifies accountability as an effective motivator of human behavior.  
According to Kang (2014 WP) under accountability theory (Tetlock et al. 1989), people adopt 
“social and cognitive strategies … to obtain acceptance from, or avoid conflict with” parties to 
whom they are accountable (Kang et al. 2014 WP; Tetlock et al. 1989).  In the context of 
financial reporting, managers are accountable to many different parties, including investors, 
regulators, their own bosses, and audit committees (Cohen et al. 2004; U.S. House of 
Representatives 2002).  Audit committees consist of a subset of the firm’s board of directors, 
who oversee the firm’s management and have the authority to terminate management.  
Accordingly, audit committees represent a high stakes source of accountability to management.   
In the course of the debate over the proposed standard, many audit committee members 
voiced concerns that expanding the auditor’s reporting model might have the effect of usurping 
the audit committee’s responsibility for investor protection (PCAOB 2011b).  I seek to inform 
the debate by investigating whether management’s accountability to the audit committee actually 
makes the audit committee’s oversight critical to the success of the proposed standard. 
2.4  Hypothesis Development 
2.4.1  Effect of Auditor Reporting of CAMs on Management Disclosure  
Recall that managers face a number of offsetting incentives when deciding what level of 
financial disclosure to provide.  On one hand, managers are encouraged to disclose by concerns 
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over their reputation (Stocken 2000; Beyer et al. 2010), litigation risk (Skinner 1997; Field et al. 
2005; Beyer et al. 2010) and the firm’s cost of capital (Beyer et al. 2010).  On the other hand, 
managers are discouraged from disclosure to avoid proprietary costs (Fischer and Verrecchia 
2004; Arya et al. 2009; Beyer et al. 2010) and to maximize their own compensation under stock-
price-sensitive compensation plans (Beyer et al. 2010).  In addition, management disclosure 
choice is sensitive to how informed managers believe investors are about whether management 
possesses private information about the firm’s risks and prospects (Beyer et al. 2010).  If 
investors are thought to know less (more) about management’s possession of private 
information, management would be expected to provide less (more) voluntary disclosure of bad 
news (Dye 1985; Jung and Kwon 1988; Penno 1997; Pae 2002; Beyer et al. 2010).   
An auditor’s decision to report a matter as a CAM effectively shines a spotlight on the 
issue.  As a result, managers are more likely to perceive a higher level of investor attention to 
and knowledge about the issue.  Management would thus be more likely to increase the level of 
disclosure for the subject of the CAM due to a shift in its incentives.  Management would derive 
less benefit from lack of disclosure because they would expect investors to “fill in the blanks.”3  
In addition, if the matter was spotlighted by the auditor, management’s concern would shift to its 
reputation and litigation risk, both of which call for increased disclosure.  Furthermore, if the 
auditor’s reporting on the CAM was more expansive and included a detailed discussion of why 
the auditor was emphasizing the matter, the perceived level of investor knowledge would be 
even higher and should lead to even greater level of disclosure provided by management.  Based 
                                                     
3 Prior accounting research (Hammersley 2006) has found that experts in a domain (e.g., industry expert auditors) 
are adept at elaborating full “cognitive representations” of a problem from partial information sets.  In the context of 
this study, expert financial users such as industry analysts could be expected to assimilate information in an 
auditor’s CAM reporting, even if it is incomplete, to identify areas of undisclosed risk in the financial statements. 
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on the foregoing discussion, primarily of economic incentives to disclose, I propose the 
following hypothesis: 
H1:  As the auditor increases the level of detailed reporting given a critical audit 
matter in its audit report, the manager will increase the level of disclosure made 
about the matter. 
 
2.4.2  Moderating Effect of Audit Committee Oversight Strength  
 
As previously discussed, management is accountable to the audit committee for its 
reporting choices.  As part of their duties, audit committees communicate with both management 
and auditors and review the company’s financial statements, disclosures and audit report in order 
to perform their financial reporting oversight (Beasley et al. 2009).  Since management has 
incentives to avoid disclosure, one purpose for the audit committee’s oversight of financial 
reporting is to constrain management’s opportunistic disclosure decisions (Agoglia et al. 2011). I 
contend that such audit committee constraint on management opportunism is inconsistent with 
the preferences of management.  To the extent that an auditor’s reporting of a critical accounting 
estimate as a CAM increases the scrutiny of management’s disclosure decision by the audit 
committee, the auditor’s reporting on the CAM is also inconsistent with management’s 
preference.   
Prior research streams in psychology and accounting identify the concept of “motivated 
sensitivity” (Ditto et al. 1998; Hales et al. 2011; Hales 2007) and its impact on the processing of 
“preference-inconsistent information” (Ditto et al. 1998).  In motivated sensitivity, people are 
expected to asymmetrically process information that is preference-consistent versus preference-
inconsistent.4  As with motivated reasoning, information that is preference-consistent is expected 
                                                     
4 The psychology and accounting research streams have each developed a stream of literature on the effect of 
“motivated reasoning” (Kunda 1990; Kadous et al. 2003; Hales 2007; Hales et al. 2011).  Generally, motivated 
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to be shallowly processed and readily accepted.  However, in motivated sensitivity, preference-
inconsistent information is expected to be processed more deeply and have a greater influence on 
the final judgment (Ditto et al. 1998).  Preference-inconsistent information is likely to signal 
some type of potential harm and so it is in the best interest of the individual to consider the 
information deeply (Ditto et al. 1998).  One example given in the motivated sensitivity literature 
relates to unfavorable health information.  People receiving unfavorable health information (i.e., 
preference-inconsistent information) are found to process it more deeply than preference-
consistent information (Ditto et al. 1998). 
In the context of this study, an auditor’s reporting of a critical accounting estimate as a 
CAM is inconsistent with management’s preference because it likely increases the audit 
committee’s scrutiny given to management’s disclosure decision.  Furthermore, ceteris paribus, 
the strength of the audit committee should impact the sensitivity of the manager to the 
information conveyed by the CAM reporting due to the differing level of accountability 
perceived by the manager to the audit committee.  Accordingly, managers facing stronger audit 
committee oversight should be expected to process more deeply and be more influenced in their 
disclosure decision by the content of reporting on the CAM than managers facing only moderate 
audit committee oversight.   
Prior accounting research on accountability identifies various strategies accountable 
parties employ to avoid conflict with parties to whom they are accountable (Gibbins and Newton 
                                                     
reasoning refers to the way in which people search for and process information relevant to a decision when the 
decision maker has a preference as to the final decision.  People are thought to vigorously pursue and readily accept 
information that is consistent with their preference and attempt to discredit and reject information that is preference-
inconsistent. These behaviors are subject to a constraint that the decision maker desires an appearance of objectivity 
in their decision making (Kunda 1990; Kadous et al. 2003). 
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1994; Peecher et al. 2013; Kang 2014 WP).  For example, accountable parties may “shift their 
attitude toward” the attitudes of their evaluators, may become defensive and try to justify their 
contrary attitudes, or may “expend cognitive effort” to devise a strategy to avoid conflict with the 
evaluator (Gibbins and Newton 1994; Peecher et al. 2013).  One determining factor for which 
strategy is used is whether the attitudes of the evaluator are known.  When such attitudes are 
known, Gibbins and Newton (1994) identify “attitude shift” as a potentially effective strategy.  
Managers confronted with strong audit committee oversight are very likely to perceive that high 
quality financial reporting is a key mandate of the audit committee (Kang 2014 WP).  
Accordingly, they are likely to adopt strategies to provide higher quality financial reporting in 
order to avoid conflict with the audit committee. Agoglia et al. (2011) find evidence of this for 
managers who face strong audit committees.  Managers in the study indicated that concern over 
“second-guessing” of their accounting decisions by the audit committee was much greater when 
the audit committee was strong than when it was weak (Agoglia et al. 2011).  These managers 
facing stronger audit committees also made more conservative accounting treatment decisions as 
a result of that concern. 
Recall that H1 predicts that as the spotlight on a critical accounting estimate increases, 
managers will increase the level of disclosure made regarding the critical accounting estimate.  
Based on the foregoing discussion, I predict that this effect will be moderated by the strength of 
audit committee oversight and therefore propose the following hypothesis: 
H2:  Managers will increase the level of disclosure made regarding a critical 
audit matter more in response to increased level of detail given the matter in the 
audit report when the audit committee’s oversight is strong than when it is 
moderate. 
 
The pattern of results predicted in H1 and H2 is presented in Figure 1. 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
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III. METHOD 
3.1  Participants 
 Given the high degree of professional judgment required for the experimental task in this 
study, it was important to ensure that participants had strong task-relevant experience (Trotman 
2005).  Accordingly, experimental participants are seasoned public company financial 
executives, primarily CFOs.  CFOs are the most likely to make the key financial disclosure 
decisions for their organizations and are therefore best equipped to provide relevant and reliable 
ex ante insights into the potential effects of the proposed standard.  I identified potential 
participants in the Audit Analytics database of officer changes. I collected recent CFO 
appointments5 for public companies between 2007 and mid-2014 with positive revenues up to $2 
billion.6  Potential participants were invited to participate in the study via a recruitment cover 
letter which described the study and its importance.  The mailing also included the experimental 
materials and a stamped return envelope.  I mailed a total of 1,889 packages7, 123 of which were 
                                                     
5 In the vast majority of cases, mailings were only sent to one CFO per company.  In five cases, mailings were 
inadvertently sent to two different individuals who had been appointed to CFO for the same company at different 
times. In addition, in one case, two mailings were sent to one individual who was concurrently CFO of two different 
companies.  In total, these mailings comprise less than 1% of the population to which mailings were sent. 
6 I followed the approach of Bishop et al. (2014) in choosing to recruit participants from companies with positive 
revenues up to $2 billion for several reasons.  First, the positive revenue requirement was to focus on operational 
companies as opposed to shell or other non-operating entities.  Next, I reasoned that companies under $2 billion 
would be both more likely to respond and have CFOs more likely to be deeply involved in the financial reporting of 
their firms.   
7 The packages were sent out in a series of four mailings over a four-month period.  The first mailing was sent in 
equal proportions to the six treatment conditions in the study.  In order to achieve adequate sample size in each 
treatment condition, subsequent mailings were sent in proportions which emphasized cells which had previously 
received fewer responses from participants. To test for differences between mailings, I added MAILING as a 
covariate to all ANCOVAs reported in Tables 2-6.  In all cases, MAILING was not significant in the analyses (all 
p’s > .26, two-tailed).  
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returned as undeliverable, for a net total of 1,766.  A total of 142 participants completed the 
experimental materials, for a response rate of 8.0%.8   
 Table 1 presents the demographics of participants in the study.   The extent and nature of 
the participants’ experience is a strong match for the demands of the experimental task.  
Participants had a mean work experience of 29.2 years9.  A total of 135 (95%) of the participants 
indicated their current title was CFO and all participants have had significant responsibility for 
their firm’s financial reporting at some point during their career.  Approximately 73.9% of the 
participants were current or former CPAs, 71.8% had prior experience as an auditor, and 23.9% 
were current or former audit committee members.   Mean age of the participants was 54.0 and 
87.9% (12.1%) of participants were male (female).10,11 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
  
                                                     
8 The response rate of 8% falls within the range of response rates in recent studies involving accounting and finance 
professionals including Agoglia et al. 2011 (11.3%); Bennett et al. 2013 WP (5.6%); and Bishop et al. 2014 WP 
(20%).  To address whether non-response bias had any effect on my primary dependent variable, Extent of 
Disclosure, I added an early/late (EARLYLATE) response indicator as a covariate to all ANCOVAs reported in 
Tables 2-6.  In all cases, EARLYLATE was not significant in the analyses (all p’s > .49, two-tailed). 
9 Thirteen of the 142 participants (9.2%) did not give precise years of work experience.  Rather, they inserted a”+” 
after the given number (e.g., 30+).  In the interest of conservatively estimating work experience, I coded these as the 
given number (e.g., 30 for “30+”). 
10One participant failed to indicate gender and two participants failed to indicate age.  These participants are 
excluded from the reported demographic information for age and gender. 
11 I tested for systematic differences between experimental cells for all key demographic variables across all 
ANCOVAs which I report as primary results (All conditions, No CAM versus Long CAM, Short CAM versus Long 
CAM and No CAM versus Short CAM).  Only one variable, GENDER, yielded a significant difference between 
cells (F5, 135 =1.99, p=.084, two-tailed when All Conditions were analyzed and F3, 92=3.325, p=.023, two-tailed when 
only No CAM and Short CAM conditions were analyzed).  To determine whether GENDER had any effect on my 
primary dependent variable, Extent of Disclosure, I added GENDER as a covariate to all ANCOVAs reported in 
Tables 2-6.  In all cases, GENDER was not significant in the analyses (all p’s > .22, two-tailed).  Accordingly, I did 
not include GENDER in the reported ANCOVA results. 
 20 
 
3.2  Design 
3.2.1  Independent Variables 
I utilized a 2X3 full factorial between subjects design.  My first independent variable, 
Audit Committee Oversight Strength (hereafter “AC Strength”), was varied at two levels, 
moderate and strong.  My manipulation of AC Strength focused on the expertise of the audit 
committee members (Agoglia et al. 2011) as well a description of the audit committee’s 
oversight of the financial reporting function.  Prior research has found that while most audit 
committees have at least one financial expert as defined by SEC rules, a minority of all audit 
committee members have expertise in accounting (Cohen et al. 2014; Badolato et al. 2013 WP).  
Thus, in the strong audit committee condition, all three members of the audit committee were 
described as accounting experts with direct accounting or financial reporting experience 
(Agoglia et al. 2011).  In the moderate audit committee condition, only 1 of the three audit 
committee members was described as a finance expert and none of the members had direct 
accounting or financial reporting expertise (Agoglia et al. 2011).12  Prior research has also 
identified significant cross-sectional variance in the intensity of audit committees’ approach to 
their oversight responsibilities (Beasley et al. 2009; Cohen et al. 2010).  Therefore, in the strong 
audit committee condition, the materials described the audit committee as playing an active role 
in resolution of challenging accounting and reporting issues including asking many questions 
about accounting and reporting issues.  In the moderate audit committee condition, the audit 
committee was described as playing a limited role in resolution of challenging accounting and 
                                                     
12 The manipulation of audit committee expertise within the AC Strength manipulation is borrowed with permission 
directly from Agoglia et al. 2011, for which I am grateful. 
 21 
 
reporting issues and occasionally asking questions about accounting and reporting issues. 
Excerpts of the AC Strength manipulations are presented in Appendix A. 
My second independent variable, Auditor Reporting Choice, was varied at three levels in 
order to investigate whether the amount of detail provided in the auditor’s CAM discussion had 
an effect on managers’ disclosure decisions beyond the identification of the issue as a CAM.  In 
the No CAM (control) condition, participants were told that the auditor had decided not to treat 
the critical accounting estimate as a CAM.  The Short CAM and Long CAM conditions were 
designed to address the concern raised by some stakeholders that if auditors provided only 
minimal CAM reporting, the proposed standard would have limited impact (PCAOB 2011b).  In 
the Short CAM condition, participants were told that the auditor had decided to treat the critical 
accounting estimate as a CAM and were provided with the auditor’s brief discussion of the CAM 
in the audit report.  The discussion was limited to the minimal information necessary to comply 
with the proposed standard -- identification of the matter and a brief discussion of why the matter 
was selected as a CAM.  In the Long CAM condition, participants were told that the auditor had 
decided to treat the critical accounting estimate as a CAM and were provided with the auditor’s 
detailed discussion of the CAM in the audit report.   The Long CAM condition included the 
information in the Short CAM condition plus a richer qualitative description of the uncertainties 
encompassed in the matter and the potential future implications. 13   
  
                                                     
13 In order to hold information constant across all conditions, the qualitative information included in the Long CAM 
condition was included for all conditions within a discussion of the auditor’s decision. 
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3.2.2  Experimental Materials and Task 
The experimental materials involved a financial reporting disclosure scenario.14  
Participants were asked to assume the role of Chief Financial Officer for a hypothetical public 
company named Andarex Corp. which has traditionally manufactured and sold high-end 
consumer products.  Andarex had been public for 10 years and has a record of consistently 
meeting its revenue and earnings growth targets.  Background materials also described good 
relations between Andarex and its auditors and a history of unqualified opinions on financial 
reporting and internal controls.  In addition, Andarex’s audit committee was described based on 
the varying treatment conditions discussed above. 
Participants were informed that Andarex’s auditors will be following a new PCAOB 
regulation that requires them to report on critical audit matters to highlight the audit and financial 
reporting issues of greatest significance.  Participants were then told they would be asked to 
consider only one audit issue for which the auditor was considering treatment as a CAM.  
Specifically, the participants would review case information about the warranty exposure 
Andarex has for a newly launched product.15 
In the most recent year, Andarex launched a new product to a completely different, cost-
conscious consumer segment.  As a result, Andarex management was confronted with the 
difficult task of estimating its warranty exposure for the new product given its different warranty 
                                                     
14 As part of instrument development, I met with three current or former chief financial officers to review all aspects 
of the case materials and post-experimental questionnaire.  In each meeting, I had the professional read the 
instrument from beginning to end stopping between sections to discuss comprehensibility and realism of the 
materials, language used and questions.  Prior to finalizing the instrument, I made revisions based on feedback 
received from the professionals to ensure the maximum comprehensibility and realism of the instrument. 
15 In the interest of accommodating professionals from a broad range of industries, I selected a warranty task as it is 
a fundamental accounting task that is widely understood by professionals with accounting experience and education 
(Perreault and Kida 2011). 
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terms and customer base for the product.  The case described a significant element of uncertainty 
in the estimate related to what percentage of customers would likely file a claim in the event of a 
defective product.  Participants received a detailed warranty calculation setting forth various 
assumptions including the one with significant uncertainty.  The warranty estimate ranged from a 
minimum of $520,000 before taxes to a maximum of $1.56 million, the difference of which is 
material to Andarex’s earnings.  Andarex decided to record the minimum amount of the range in 
the current year until such time as it has more history with regard to the assumptions in the 
estimate. 
After reviewing the case materials including a detailed discussion of the warranty 
estimate as well as the auditor’s decision whether or not to treat the warranty issue as a CAM, 
participants rated the extent of disclosure they would choose to make about the warranty estimate 
as well as the likelihood that they would disclose different elements of information related to the 
warranty issue in Andarex’s financial reporting.   
3.2.3  Dependent Variables 
I collected one primary dependent variable and six secondary dependent variables from 
participants in the study.  First, the primary dependent variable was a measurement of the extent 
of disclosure (Extent of Disclosure) that the participant would choose to provide for the warranty 
estimate rated on a 10-point Likert scale where 1 = minimal disclosure and 10 = extensive 
disclosure.  I interpret increases in Extent of Disclosure as increases in the amount of information 
participants intend to communicate to the financial statement user through their disclosure.  In 
this context, I contend that increases in Extent of Disclosure correspond with increases in 
disclosure quality as users have more information with which to assess the risks and prospects of 
the firm.  I treat Extent of Disclosure as my primary dependent variable as it is important to 
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obtain an overall measure of participants’ intention with regard to how much information will be 
disclosed before delving into the specifics of what elements of disclosure managers may choose 
to enrich the overall disclosure.     
Participants were next asked to consider six individual disclosure elements that could be 
included in the disclosure of Andarex’s warranty exposure issue.  I collect these ratings in order 
to perform further analysis of the different elements of information that managers might be more 
likely to include as Extent of Disclosure increases.  Each disclosure element was rated on a 10-
point Likert scale where 1 = Definitely Not Disclose and 10 = Definitely Disclose.16  Each rating 
addressed a different element of disclosure.  Certain of the disclosure elements represent 
quantitative information that could enhance the financial statement user’s ability to quantify the 
risk in a critical accounting estimate.  These elements include (i) the range of the warranty 
estimate (RANGE); a description of the key uncertain assumption in the estimate (KEY 
ASSUMPTION); and (iii) a sensitivity analysis of the warranty estimate based on movement in 
the key uncertain assumption (SENSITIVITY).  While disclosures of this type are generally 
required by current SEC regulations, many stakeholders have pointed to a lack of compliance in 
this area (PCAOB 2011b).  Other disclosure elements collected are more commonplace in 
current practice including (i) the amounts reported in the financial statements (FS AMOUNT); 
(ii) the rationale for the recorded amount (RATIONALE); and (iii) a description of uncertainty in 
                                                     
16 Since I contend that each of the disclosure elements I measure is necessary for a complete disclosure of the critical 
accounting estimate (see note 17), I interpret an increase in the likelihood of management disclosure of each element 
as an increase in the quality of the firm’s overall disclosure of the critical accounting estimate. 
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the estimate (UNCERTAINTY).17  A concrete example of each disclosure element was provided 
before the rating was elicited.  The disclosure element examples are included in Appendix C. 
3.2.4  Procedures 
 The experimental materials were divided into two packets.  Packet 1 included the case 
materials and concluded with the disclosure ratings described above.  Participants first read an 
introduction to the experiment including the role of CFO they assume in the case.  Next, the 
participants were given information regarding the company, its audit committee (including the 
AC Strength manipulation) and the audit currently underway.  Participants were then informed of 
the auditor’s decision whether or not to report Andarex’s warranty issue as a CAM (the Auditor 
Reporting Choice manipulation).  Finally, a detailed discussion of the warranty reserve issue was 
provided.  After reviewing the materials, participants provided their disclosure ratings.  
Participants were instructed to read and complete Packet 1 before proceeding to Packet 2.  Packet 
2 was a post-experimental questionnaire which included manipulation check questions as well as 
questions about the experiment, participant judgments and demographic information.  
Participants were instructed not to refer to Packet 1 while completing Packet 2.  The flow of the 
experiment is summarized in Figure 2.  
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
  
                                                     
17 Taken together, I contend that disclosure of all these elements would result in a rich disclosure of the critical 
accounting estimate more in line with the intentions of the SEC regulations.  It is likely that management has 
differing sensitivities to disclosure of these elements.  For example, management is likely to be highly sensitive to 
the disclosure of the range of the warranty estimate, description of the key assumptions in the estimate and 
sensitivity analysis of the estimate.  Disclosure of the amount of warranty expense and warranty accrual in the 
financial statements is commonplace and managers are less likely to be sensitive to disclosure of these elements.  
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IV. RESULTS 
4.1  Manipulation Checks 
AC Strength was manipulated as either moderate or strong between subjects.  To test 
whether the manipulation was effective, I collected participant ratings of the audit committee’s 
strength on two dimensions, accounting/financial expertise (Agoglia et al. 2011) and audit 
committee involvement in financial reporting decisions.  Participants rated audit committee 
oversight strength on a 7-point Likert scale where 1 = Low and 7 = High (Agoglia et al. 2011).18  
Participants in the Strong AC Strength condition rated the audit committee’s accounting/financial 
expertise as significantly stronger than participants in the Moderate AC Strength condition (6.07 
versus 2.91, t139=15.61, p<.001, two-tailed).  Participants in the Strong AC condition also rated 
the audit committee’s involvement in financial reporting issues as significantly stronger than 
participants in the Moderate AC Strength condition (5.83 versus 3.12, t138=11.21, p<.001, two-
tailed).  These ratings provide evidence of an effective manipulation of AC Strength in the 
experiment. 
To test the effectiveness of my Auditor Reporting Choice manipulation, I performed two 
tests.  First, all participants were asked to recall whether the auditor in the case decided to report 
Andarex’s warranty issue as a CAM. Of the 142 participants, 137 (96.5%) correctly recalled the 
auditor’s choice regarding the CAM.19  Next, I specifically tested the effectiveness of the 
manipulation of Auditor Reporting Choice between the short CAM and Long CAM conditions 
by comparing how participants rated the informativeness of the CAM discussion provided by the 
                                                     
18 Two of the 142 participants failed to provide one or both of the AC Strength ratings and are excluded from the 
manipulation check tests. 
19 Of the 5 remaining participants, four answered the question incorrectly and one failed to answer the question. 
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auditor in the audit report.  Participants in the No CAM condition are excluded from this test as 
no CAM discussion was provided by the auditor on which to measure informativeness.  
Participants rated how informative the auditor’s CAM reporting was on a 7-point Likert scale 
where 1 = Not at all Informative and 7 = Very Informative.20  Participants in the Long CAM 
condition rated the auditor’s CAM reporting as significantly more informative than in the Short 
CAM condition (4.67 versus 3.89, t90=2.73, p<.01, two-tailed).  Collectively, these results 
provide evidence of an effective manipulation of Auditor Reporting Choice. 
4.2  Hypothesis Tests 
Hypothesis 1 predicts that as the auditor increases the spotlight on a critical accounting 
estimate through the level of detailed reporting given the matter in its audit report, managers will 
increase the level of disclosure made regarding the matter.  As reported in table 2, the pattern of 
results followed this prediction.  Participants rated the Extent of Disclosure they would provide 
about the warranty exposure issue lowest in the No CAM control condition ( x =6.72) and Extent 
of Disclosure increased as the auditor provided greater detail in the Short CAM ( x =7.08) and 
Long CAM ( x =7.42) conditions, respectively.   To test hypothesis 1, I conducted an ANCOVA 
analysis of the effect of Auditor Reporting Choice and AC Strength on the primary dependent 
variable, Extent of Disclosure.21  Results of the ANCOVA reported in table 2 show a marginal 
effect of Auditor Reporting Choice on Extent of Disclosure  (F2, 134 =1.889, p=.078, one-tailed) 
                                                     
20 Of the 95 participants in the Short CAM and Long CAM conditions, 3 failed to answer the question and are 
excluded from the manipulation check tests. 
21 I include a covariate in the analysis for the effect of the participants’ concern that disclosure would reveal 
proprietary information about the company (Proprietary) as prior research has identified this as a significant factor 
in management’s disclosure decision (Fischer and Verrecchia 2004; Arya et al. 2009; Beyer et al. 2010).  As 
expected, the covariate for Proprietary has a significant effect on Extent of Disclosure (F2, 134=12.42, p<.001, one-
tailed).  Results of an ANOVA excluding the Proprietary covariate were qualitatively similar.  While the 
significance of the main effects of Auditor Reporting Choice and AC Strength were somewhat weaker, the 
interaction of Auditor Reporting Choice and AC Strength remained significant at p<.01. 
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providing marginal support for Hypothesis 1 indicating that managers respond to the auditor 
providing greater detail about a critical accounting estimate in its report by increasing their own 
disclosure of the matter.   
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 Hypothesis 2 predicts that the strength of the audit committee’s oversight will moderate 
the effect of the auditor’s CAM reporting choice on the Extent of Disclosure about the warranty 
estimate issue provided by the manager.  Specifically, H2 predicts that the effect of the auditor’s 
CAM reporting choice on Extent of Disclosure will be greatest when audit committee oversight 
is strongest.  The results reported in Table 222 and Figure 3 provide support for this prediction.  
When audit committee oversight is strong, the Extent of Disclosure provided by the manager is 
greatest in the Long CAM condition ( x =8.08) compared to the No CAM condition ( x =6.95) 
and the Short CAM discussion ( x =6.79).  When audit committee oversight strength is only 
moderate, the Extent of Disclosure provided by the manager is no greater in the Long CAM 
condition ( x =6.53) than in the No CAM condition ( x =6.52) and is actually lower than in the 
Short CAM discussion ( x =7.36).23  As reported in Table 2, the interaction of Auditor Reporting 
Choice and AC Strength is significant (F2, 134=5.448, p=.003, one-tailed).
24  Simple effects 
analysis reveals that when audit committee oversight is strong, Extent of Disclosure is higher in 
the Long CAM condition than in the No CAM condition (F1, 45=8.195, p=.006) and the Short 
                                                     
22 One of the 142 participants did not provide an Extent of Disclosure rating, the primary dependent variable.  This 
participant is excluded from all results for Extent of Disclosure. 
23 See Supplemental Analysis – Comparison of CAM conditions for a discussion of this unexpected result. 
24 To provide further evidence of the predicted interaction, I conducted a planned contrast of the effect of Auditor 
Reporting Choice and AC Strength on Extent of Disclosure as it is a more powerful test of a predicted ordinal 
interaction (Buckless and Ravenscroft 1990).  Contrast coefficients were +5 for Strong AC/Long CAM, +2 for 
Strong AC/ Short CAM, -1 for Strong AC/No CAM, -1 for Moderate AC/Long CAM, -2 for Moderate AC/ Short 
CAM, and -3 for Moderate AC/No CAM.  As expected, results of the planned contrast reported in Table 2, Panel C 
were significant (t135=2.69, p=.004, one-tailed). 
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CAM condition (F1, 47=7.143, p=.010).  However, when audit committee oversight is only 
moderate, Extent of Disclosure is no different in the Long CAM condition than in the No CAM 
condition (F1, 41=.013, p=.910) and is actually lower than in the Short CAM condition (F1, 
41=4.925, p=.032).  Collectively, these results indicate that the audit committee’s oversight will 
play an important role in determining the impact of auditors’ increased reporting of CAMs on 
managers’ disclosure choices with stronger audit committee oversight leading to greater 
increases in disclosure when auditors increase the level of detail given a CAM in their audit 
reports.    
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
4.3  Supplemental Analysis 
4.3.1  Comparisons of CAM conditions 
In order to gain further insight into the results, I performed a series of supplemental 
comparisons to determine specific effects of the various levels of CAM reporting choices.  I first 
compared the No CAM control condition and Long CAM condition.  This is the starkest 
comparison which allows me to investigate the maximum effect of a Long CAM discussion by 
the auditor on management’s disclosure decisions.  The pattern of results for this comparison are 
presented in Figure 4.  When audit committee oversight is strong, the Extent of Disclosure 
provided by the manager is significantly greater (F1, 45=8.195, p=.006) in the Long CAM 
condition ( x =8.08) than in the No CAM condition ( x =6.95).  When audit committee oversight 
strength is only moderate, the Extent of Disclosure provided by the manager is no greater (F1, 
41=.013, p=.910) in the Long CAM condition ( x =6.53) than in the No CAM condition ( x
=6.52).  As reported in Table 3, the results were consistent with the full results reported above.  
As expected, the ANCOVA results reveal a significant effect of Auditor Reporting Choice on 
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Extent of Disclosure (F1, 87=3.579, p=.031, one-tailed).  In addition, the interaction of Auditor 
Reporting Choice and AC Strength is significant (F1, 87=2.800, p=.049, one-tailed).
25  These 
results provide evidence that inclusion of a detailed CAM discussion regarding a critical 
accounting estimate in the audit report leads to greater disclosure by managers than when the 
estimate is not treated as a CAM by the auditor and this effect is strongest when audit committee 
oversight is strong. 
[Insert Table 3 and Figure 4 here] 
Next, I compared the Short CAM and long CAM conditions to investigate whether the 
level of detail in the discussion provided for the CAM affects the manager’s Extent of Disclosure 
decision.  As can be seen in Figure 5, when audit committee oversight is strong, the Extent of 
Disclosure provided by the manager is significantly greater (F1, 47=7.143, p=.010) in the Long 
CAM condition ( x =8.08) than in the Short CAM condition ( x =6.79).  When audit committee 
oversight strength is only moderate, the Extent of Disclosure provided by the manager in the 
Long CAM condition ( x =6.53) is actually significantly lower (F1, 41=4.925, p=.032) than in the 
Short CAM condition ( x =7.36).26  Results of the ANCOVA are presented in Table 4.  While the 
main effect of Auditor Reporting Choice is not significant (F1, 89=.131, p=.359, one-tailed), the 
interaction of Auditor Reporting Choice and AC Strength is significant (F1, 89=9.921, p=.001, 
                                                     
25 To provide further evidence of the predicted interaction, I conducted a planned contrast of the effect of Auditor 
Reporting Choice and AC Strength on Extent of Disclosure.   Contrast coefficients were +5 for Strong AC/Long 
CAM, -1 for Strong AC/No CAM, -1 for Moderate AC/Long CAM, and -3 for Moderate AC/No CAM.  As 
expected, results of the planned contrast reported in Table 3, Panel C were significant (t88=3.51, p=.001, one-tailed). 
26 This result should be interpreted with caution as it may be an anomaly.  Recall that along with this Extent of 
Disclosure rating, I also collected individual ratings for six disclosure elements. Comparison between the Short 
CAM and Long CAM conditions for these disclosure element ratings as well as the mean of all disclosure element 
ratings is presented in Table 8.  The decrease in Extent of Disclosure between the Short CAM and Long CAM 
conditions when audit committee oversight is only moderate is not seen in the likelihood to disclose ratings for any 
of the disclosure elements or the mean of all ratings.  So, it would seem that while participants in the Short CAM/ 
Moderate AC condition favored a higher Extent of Disclosure than participants in the Long CAM/Moderate AC 
condition, this did not translate to them being more likely to disclose any of the individual elements.   
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one-tailed).27  Collectively, these results suggest that the level of detail provided in the auditor’s 
CAM discussion is an important determinant of the manager’s disclosure choice regarding the 
matter and that greater detail in the auditor’s CAM discussion is likely to lead to greater 
disclosure by management. 
[Insert Table 4 and Figure 5 here] 
 Finally, I compared the No CAM control condition and the Short CAM condition to 
determine whether the auditor merely identifying the warranty estimate issue as a CAM and 
providing a brief discussion in the audit report would impact manager disclosure decisions.  As 
can be seen in Figure 6, when audit committee oversight is strong, the Extent of Disclosure 
provided by the manager is no different (F1, 43=.030, p=.864) in the Short CAM condition ( x
=6.79) from the No CAM condition ( x =6.95).  When audit committee oversight strength is only 
moderate, the Extent of Disclosure provided by the manager in the Short CAM condition ( x
=7.36) is significantly greater (F1, 47=6.952, p=.011) than in the No CAM condition ( x =6.52).
28  
As reported in table 5, Auditor Reporting Choice is not significant (F1, 91=2.404, p=.124, two-
tailed).29  The interaction of Auditor Reporting Choice and AC Strength was marginally 
                                                     
27 To provide further evidence of the predicted interaction, I conducted a planned contrast of the effect of Auditor 
Reporting Choice and AC Strength on Extent of Disclosure.  Contrast coefficients were +4 for Strong AC/Long 
CAM, +1 for Strong AC/Short CAM, -2 for Moderate AC/Long CAM, and -3 for Moderate AC/Short CAM.  As 
expected, results of the planned contrast reported in Table 4, Panel C were significant (t90=2.07, p=.021, one-tailed). 
28 Once again, this result should be interpreted with caution as it may be an anomaly related to the same participant 
ratings of Extent of Disclosure for the Short CAM/Moderate AC condition discussed in footnote 27.  As before, I 
compared the individual disclosure element ratings as well as the mean of all disclosure element ratings between the 
Short CAM and No CAM conditions presented in Table 9.  The increase in Extent of Disclosure between the No 
CAM and Short CAM conditions when audit committee oversight is only moderate is not seen in the likelihood to 
disclose ratings for any of the disclosure elements or the mean of all ratings.  So, it would seem that while 
participants in the Short CAM/ Moderate AC condition favored a higher Extent of Disclosure than participants in the 
No CAM/Moderate AC condition, this did not translate to them being more likely to disclose any of the individual 
elements. 
29 I used two-tailed tests for this ANCOVA because the pattern of results was inconsistent with theory. 
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significant (F1, 91=2.862, p=.094, two-tailed) but not in the pattern predicted by theory.
30  
Collectively, these results suggest that if the auditor only provides minimal detail in its CAM 
reporting, disclosure by the manager might not be affected. 
[Insert Table 5 and Figure 6 here] 
4.3.2  Disclosure Element Ratings 
Management has to make a wide variety of decisions regarding what they feel is 
important to disclose.  Recall that I identified six disclosure elements that collectively would 
make up a comprehensive disclosure of the critical accounting estimate.  To develop further 
insight on management disclosure choices, I analyzed participant ratings of the likelihood that 
they would choose to disclose each item.  Results of the disclosure element ratings are reported 
in Tables 6 through 9.  For each disclosure element in each comparison (all conditions, No CAM 
vs Long CAM, Short CAM vs Long CAM, and No CAM vs Short CAM), I conducted planned 
contrasts with weightings identical to the planned contrasts for Extent of Disclosure  described in 
the primary analysis. In other words, I am testing whether participants increase the likelihood 
that they would disclose the element in response to an increase in the level of the auditor’s CAM 
reporting and whether that increase in likelihood to disclose is greater in the presence of stronger 
audit committee oversight.   
Several elements of disclosure stand out in the analysis. Most notable are three elements 
of disclosure, each of which provide quantitative information that would enhance the financial 
statement user’s ability to quantify the risk in the warranty estimate.  Specifically, participants’ 
                                                     
30 As an additional test of the predicted interaction, I conducted a planned contrast of the effect of Auditor Reporting 
Choice and AC Strength on Extent of Disclosure.  Contrast coefficients were +4 for Strong AC/Short CAM, +1 for 
Strong AC/No CAM, -2 for Moderate AC/Short CAM, and -3 for Moderate AC/No CAM.  Results of the planned 
contrast reported in Table 5, Panel C were not significant (t92=-.082, p=.935, two-tailed). 
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ratings of the likelihood that they would disclose the RANGE of the warranty estimate, the KEY 
ASSUMPTION used in the estimate, and a SENSITIVITY analysis of the warranty estimate each 
followed the general pattern of results predicted.31 
In the comparison of all six treatment conditions reported in Table 6, the planned contrast 
was marginally significant for RANGE (t136=1.404, p=.082, one-tailed).  In addition, the planned 
contrasts for KEY ASSUMPTION and SENSITIVITY were significant (all p’s<.05, one-tailed).  In 
the comparison of the No CAM and Long CAM conditions reported in Table 7, RANGE, KEY 
ASSUMPTION, and SENSITIVITY were all significant (all p’s<.053, one-tailed).  In the 
comparison of the Short CAM and Long CAM conditions reported in Table 8, KEY 
ASSUMPTION and SENSITIVITY were significant (all p’s<.05, one-tailed).  In all of these 
results, the disclosure element was rated as most likely to be disclosed in the Long CAM/Strong 
AC condition.  This finding is of particular importance as these quantitative disclosure elements 
are the type of information frequently cited as lacking in management disclosure (PCAOB 
2011b) and is consistent with participants increasing the Extent of Disclosure as discussed in the 
primary results.  
In the comparison of the No CAM and Short CAM conditions reported in Table 9, none 
of the planned contrasts for RANGE, KEY ASSUMPTION, or SENSITIVITY disclosure elements 
were found to be significant (all p’s >.62, two-tailed.).  A closer review of the results reveals that 
there is no discernible pattern wherein minimal auditor CAM reporting leads to greater manager 
disclosure than if the auditor chooses not to report the matter as a CAM, regardless of the audit 
                                                     
31 This is particularly noteworthy in light of the fact that even in the Long CAM condition, the auditor’s discussion 
did not include any specific quantitative information regarding the warranty estimate.  This was an intentional 
design choice to avoid the manager’s decision to disclose being a foregone conclusion if the auditor provided such 
information in their own CAM discussion of the warranty estimate.  
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committee oversight strength.  Importantly, this finding provides support for investor and 
regulator concerns that minimal CAM reporting will not lead to meaningful improvement in 
manager disclosure. 
In all of the comparisons, Elements of disclosure that do not reveal quantitative risk in the 
warranty estimate do not follow the pattern of results predicted in Hypothesis 2.  Specifically, 
participant ratings of the likelihood that they would disclose (i) the FS AMOUNT of the warranty 
estimate actually recorded in the financial statements; and (ii) a qualitative description of 
UNCERTAINTY in the estimate each did not conform to the predicted pattern of results (all p’s 
> .29, one-tailed except the comparison of No CAM and Short CAM which is two-tailed).  This 
finding is not unexpected because disclosure of this type of information is already commonplace. 
There was also no significant result for RATIONALE, which might be due to the fact that it did 
not communicate much in the way of incremental information beyond information in the other 
disclosure elements. 
[Insert Tables 6 through 9 here]  
4.4  Discussion 
 The primary and supplemental analyses provide a number of important insights into the 
effect of the proposed standard on management disclosure decisions.  First, the results generally 
support my prediction that managers will react to the auditor shining a spotlight on a highly 
uncertain critical accounting estimate by increasing their own disclosure of the matter.  Second, 
audit committee oversight is likely to play an important role in determining the impact of 
auditors’ increased reporting of CAMs on managers’ disclosure choices.  Managers facing strong 
audit committee oversight are likely to increase the extent of their disclosure more than when the 
audit committee oversight is only moderate.  Third, the level of detail provided by the auditor in 
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its CAM reporting plays an important role in determining the extent of disclosure the manager 
chooses to make.  When the auditor provides a minimal discussion of the CAM, management 
does not appear likely to respond with increased disclosure.  However, when the auditor’s CAM 
discussion is detailed, management is likely to respond with increased disclosure of its own.  
Finally, when the auditor provides a detailed CAM discussion, it appears that managers are likely 
to increase disclosure of quantitative information that would enhance the financial statement 
user’s ability to quantify the risk in a critical accounting estimate.  This is particularly 
encouraging as this was one of the central goals of the PCAOB auditor’s reporting model project. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This study investigates whether the current changes proposed by the PCAOB to the 
auditor’s reporting model are likely to spur management to provide enhanced disclosure that 
investors are demanding about areas of uncertainty in the financial statements.  According to 
Martin Baumann, Chief Auditor of the PCAOB, the proposed standard is among initiatives that 
“would make very significant changes to the auditor's report for the first time in some 75 years” 
(PCAOB 2014).  Thus, it is important to all stakeholders in the financial reporting process to 
develop an ex ante understanding of how proposed changes might affect financial reporting and 
disclosure quality (Maines 1994; Beresford 1997).   
To study the effects of the proposed standard, I conducted an experiment involving 
highly experienced public company financial executives, primarily chief financial officers.  The 
extensive experience of the participant group was critical given the importance of obtaining 
reliable insights on the proposal.  Participants rated the extent of disclosure they would be likely 
to give for a highly uncertain critical accounting estimate.  In addition, they rated the likelihood 
that they would disclose a variety of disclosure elements related to the critical accounting 
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estimate.  The experiment varied how the auditor decided to treat the critical accounting estimate 
in their audit report as well as the strength of the audit committee’s oversight over financial 
reporting.  
Results of the experiment provide a number of important insights into the potential effect 
of the proposed change to the auditor’s reporting model.  I find that managers will react to 
detailed auditor reporting of a CAM by increasing their own disclosure of the matter including 
quantitative information which could enhance the financial statement user’s ability to quantify 
the risk in a critical accounting estimate.  In addition, I find that the level of detail provided by 
the auditor in its CAM reporting plays an important role in determining the extent of disclosure 
the manager chooses to make.  Finally, despite concerns about the diminished role of the audit 
committee should the proposed standard be adopted, I find that the audit committee is likely to 
continue to be a key source of accountability playing a pivotal role in the effectiveness of the 
auditor’s reporting model changes. 
There are limitations to the study which represent opportunities for future research.  In 
order to gain initial insights on the effect of the proposed standard on manager disclosure 
decisions, my experimental setting was an intentionally simple one in which the auditor makes 
an independent decision whether or not to report a CAM and what level of detail to provide.  
Furthermore, my design intentionally avoided the prospect of the auditor discussing specific 
quantitative information about the critical accounting estimate in its CAM reporting in order to 
allow managers to make unconstrained decisions whether or not to disclose the information 
themselves.  In reality, the process is likely to follow a more iterative structure akin to the 
auditor-client negotiation process of resolving audit adjustments (Gibbins et al. 2001, Sanchez et 
al. 2007).  On one hand, auditors are likely to signal their preferences for disclosure to clients in 
 37 
 
the hopes that disclosure will meet their preferences. On the other hand, clients are likely to seek 
compromise with auditors on the minimum level of disclosure the auditor will accept without 
needing to disclose original information about the company in its CAM reporting.  This auditor-
client interaction represents a fruitful area for future research. 
The study has important implications for the various stakeholders to the PCAOB project 
on the auditor’s reporting model as well as academic research.  First, in order to pursue their 
objective of providing greater information to the markets, it is critical for regulators to continue 
to emphasize the importance of auditors providing more than cursory discussion of CAMs in 
their audit report.  The study confirms fears raised by many that minimal discussion of CAMs by 
auditors in their report is unlikely to lead managers to provide disclosure about uncertainty in the 
financial statements that investors are demanding.  Next, the quality of audit committee oversight 
is likely to have an effect on how managers react to enhancements of the auditor report under the 
proposed standard.   Strong audit committee oversight will be needed for the full benefits of the 
proposed standard to be reaped by investors.  Finally, the study extends the accounting literature 
regarding the effect of regulatory changes on financial reporting quality.  Most of the concurrent 
studies on the proposed standard focus on financial stakeholders other than management such as 
auditors and investors.  Many of these studies, as a necessary part of their design, presume that 
the manager does not react to enhancements in the audit report.  The results of this study suggest 
that if proposed regulatory change is implemented correctly and corporate governance is strong, 
higher quality financial reporting by management will more likely be forthcoming.   
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Appendix A – Audit Committee Description32 
All conditions received the following general information regarding the Audit Committee: 
Andarex’s audit committee is responsible for overseeing the financial reporting process, 
including a review of the company’s financial statements and disclosures.  The audit 
committee meets about eight times a year and is made up of three members, all of whom 
satisfy the independence criteria for audit committee members.  In addition: 
The following additional information about the audit committee and its oversight constitute the 
AC Strength manipulation: 
Moderate Audit Committee Oversight condition 
 Only one of the members qualifies as an “audit committee financial expert,” as 
prescribed by the SEC, and is viewed as a supervisory financial expert.  That is, this is an 
individual with an understanding of financial reporting but no direct accounting or 
financial reporting experience. While this individual qualifies as an audit committee 
financial expert, none of the members has any direct accounting or financial 
reporting experience.  
 The audit committee is somewhat involved in the resolution of key accounting and 
disclosure issues. Audit committee members are reactive; they follow discussions of the 
issues during meetings but they do not ask too many questions regarding these issues. 
 
Strong Audit Committee Oversight condition 
 All of the members qualify as “audit committee financial experts,” as prescribed by 
the SEC, and are viewed as accounting financial experts.  That is, these are individuals 
with an understanding of financial reporting and direct accounting or financial reporting 
experience. 
 The audit committee is actively involved in the resolution of key accounting and 
disclosure issues.  Audit committee members are proactive; they lead discussion of 
issues during meetings, often ask probing questions, and debate the appropriate 
accounting treatment regarding key transactions/issues. 
                                                     
32 Significant portions of the Audit Committee Description in my instrument, most importantly the description of the 
audit committee’s expertise and part of the introduction, are borrowed with permission directly from Agoglia et al. 
2011, for which I am grateful. 
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Appendix B – Auditor Reporting Choice33 
No CAM condition (received the following paragraph and no CAM excerpt of the audit report) 
After careful consideration, in their best judgment, the auditors have decided it is not necessary 
to include a discussion of the warranty exposure related to its new product offering as a Critical 
Audit Matter in its audit report. 
Short CAM and Long CAM Conditions (received the following paragraph plus the applicable 
excerpt of the audit report) 
After careful consideration, in their best judgment, the auditors have decided it is necessary to 
include a discussion of the warranty exposure related to Andarex’s new product offering as a 
Critical Audit Matter in its audit report.  Following is the language that the auditor intends to use 
to address the warranty exposure issue in its audit report: 
 
Excerpt of Audit Report 
 
Critical Audit Matter (Long CAM condition) 
 
The Company has potential warranty obligations associated with a new product 
launched during 2012.  The Company is required to estimate the exposure and record a 
Warranty Liability and associated Warranty Expense in the Consolidated Balance Sheet 
and Income Statement as of and for the year ended December 31, 2012, respectively.  
Management’s estimate of the warranty exposure incorporates subjective assumptions 
that have a high degree of uncertainty.  In particular, the percentage of Andarex’s 
customers with a defective unit that will actually file a warranty claim could be much 
higher than the Company estimated.  The Company recorded the warranty liability at the 
lower end of the estimate range.  Consequently, actual warranty expenses to be incurred 
could be significantly higher and earnings could be significantly lower than the amount 
recorded.   
Critical Audit Matter (Short CAM condition) 
 
The Company has potential warranty obligations associated with a new product 
launched during 2012.  The Company is required to estimate the exposure and record a 
Warranty Liability and associated Warranty Expense in the Consolidated Balance Sheet 
and Income Statement as of and for the year ended December 31, 2012, respectively.  
Management’s estimate of the warranty exposure incorporates several subjective 
assumptions that have a high degree of uncertainty.   
  
                                                     
33 In order to hold information constant across all conditions, the qualitative information included in the Long CAM 
audit report excerpt was included for all conditions within a discussion of the auditor’s decision. 
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Appendix C – Examples of Disclosure Elements 
FS AMOUNT 
The Company has recorded a warranty accrual and related warranty expense of $520,000 for 
Product B in the Consolidated Balance Sheet and Statement of Income as of and for the year 
ended December 31, 2012, respectively. 
RANGE 
The Company calculated the potential warranty exposure associated with Product B and 
estimates that the exposure is between a minimum of $520,000 and a maximum of $1,560,000 as 
of December 31, 2012.  The Company recorded warranty expense and reserve for the minimum 
amount of the potential exposure range ($520,000) as of December 31, 2012. 
RATIONALE 
The Company has decided to record warranty expense and reserve for the minimum amount of 
the potential exposure range ($520,000) as of December 31, 2012 until the Company has more 
experience with actual claims and costs. 
KEY ASSUMPTION 
The Company’s estimate of warranty exposure is based on a key assumption.  Specifically, the 
Company has estimated a range for the likelihood that a customer with a defective unit will 
actually file a warranty claim of between 20% and 60%. 
UNCERTAINTY 
The Company’s estimate of warranty exposure for Product B incorporates a subjective 
assumption that has a high degree of uncertainty. Specifically, the customer segment for Product 
B is new to the Company and it is difficult to estimate the likelihood that a customer with a 
defective unit will actually file a warranty claim.   Actual warranty expenses to be incurred could 
be significantly higher than the amount recorded in the financial statements. 
SENSITIVITY 
The estimate of warranty exposure depends on the Company’s estimate of the likelihood that a 
customer with a defective unit will actually file a warranty claim, which ranges from 20% to 
60%.  The warranty accrual recorded by the Company is based on a 20% claims rate. Each 
increase of 10% in the claims rate would result in additional warranty expense of $260,000 
before income taxes. 
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Figure 1 – Predicted Pattern of Results – All Conditions 
   
Figure 2 – Flow of Experiment 
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Figure 3 – Actual Pattern of Results – All Conditions 
   
Figure 4 – Actual Pattern of Results – No CAM and Long CAM Conditions 
  
 
Figure 5 – Actual Pattern of Results – Short CAM and Long CAM Conditions 
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Figure 6 – Actual Pattern of Results for H2 – No CAM and Short CAM Conditions 
  
 
Table 1 – Demographic Information 
Years of Work Experience  29.2 years 
Has Experience as Auditor  71.8% 
Current or Former Audit 
Committee Member 
 23.9% 
Current or Former CPA  73.9% 
Age  54.0 years 
Gender  87.9% Male 
12.1% Female 
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Table 2 – Rating of Extent of Disclosure – All Treatment Conditions 
Panel A: Mean (standard deviation) Ratings of Extent of Disclosurea by Audit Committee 
Oversight Strength and Auditor Reporting Choice 
 AUDITOR REPORTING CHOICEb  
Overall No CAM Short CAM Long CAM 
AUDIT 
COMMITTEE 
OVERSIGHT 
STRENGTHc 
 
STRONG 
 
6.95 
(1.76) 
n = 22 
6.79 
(1.72) 
n = 24 
8.08 
(1.62) 
n = 26 
7.31 
(1.77) 
n = 72 
 
MODERATE 
6.52 
(1.78) 
n = 25 
7.36 
(1.73) 
n = 25 
6.53 
(1.90) 
n = 19 
6.83 
(1.82) 
n = 69 
 
Overall  
6.72 
(1.77) 
n = 47 
7.08 
(1.73) 
n = 49 
7.42 
(1.89) 
n = 45 
 
 
Panel B: ANCOVA results for Ratings of Extent of Disclosure 
Source of Variation df SS F-Value p-value (1-
tailed 
Audit Committee Oversight Strength 
Auditor Reporting Choice 
Audit Committee Oversight Strength  X 
     Auditor Reporting Choice 
Covariate: 
      Proprietary Informationd 
1 
2 
 
2 
 
1 
9.182 
10.616 
 
30.622 
 
34.909 
3.267 
1.889 
 
5.448 
 
12.422 
.037 
.078 
 
.003 
 
.001 
 
Panel C: Planned Contrast for Test of Effect of Auditor Reporting Choice and Audit 
Committee Oversight Strength on Ratings of Extent of Disclosure 
 t-statistic p-value (1-tailed) 
Model contraste 2.690 .004 
 
aExtent of Disclosure was rated on a 10-point scale where 1=minimal disclosure and 10=extensive disclosure. 
bAuditor Reporting Choice was varied at three levels, No CAM, Short CAM and Long CAM.  See Appendix B for 
excerpts for each condition. 
cAudit Committee Oversight Strength was varied at two levels, moderate and strong.  See Appendix A for excerpts 
for each condition. 
dParticipants rated how concerned they were that disclosing information about the warranty exposure issue would 
reveal proprietary information about the company to its competitors on a 7-point scale where 1 = Very little 
concerned and 7 = Very concerned. 
eContrast coefficients were -1 for Strong AC/No CAM, +2 for Strong AC/ Short CAM, +5 for Strong AC/Long 
CAM,  -3 for Moderate AC/No CAM, -2 for Moderate AC/ Short CAM, and -1 for Moderate AC/Long CAM. 
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Table 3 – Rating of Extent of Disclosure – Comparison of No CAM and Long CAM 
conditions 
Panel A: Mean (standard deviation) Ratings of Extent of Disclosurea by Audit Committee 
Oversight Strength and Auditor Reporting Choice 
 AUDITOR REPORTING 
CHOICEb 
 
Overall 
No CAM Long CAM 
AUDIT 
COMMITTEE 
OVERSIGHT 
STRENGTHc 
 
STRONG 
 
6.95 
(1.76) 
n = 22 
8.08 
(1.62) 
n = 26 
7.56 
(1.76) 
n = 48 
 
MODERATE 
6.52 
(1.78) 
n = 25 
6.53 
(1.90) 
n = 19 
6.52 
(1.81) 
n = 44 
 
Overall  
6.72 
(1.77) 
n = 47 
7.42 
(1.89) 
n = 45 
 
 
Panel B: ANCOVA results for Ratings of Extent of Disclosure 
Source of Variation df SS F-Value p-value (1-
tailed 
Audit Committee Oversight Strength 
Auditor Reporting Choice 
Audit Committee Oversight Strength  X 
     Auditor Reporting Choice 
Covariate: 
      Proprietary Informationd 
1 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
28.442 
9.486 
 
7.421 
 
41.167 
10.730 
3.579 
 
2.800 
 
15.531 
.001 
.031 
 
.049 
 
.000 
 
Panel C: Planned Contrast for Test of Effect of Auditor Reporting Choice and Audit 
Committee Oversight Strength on Ratings of Extent of Disclosure 
 t-statistic p-value (1-tailed) 
Model contraste 3.507 .001 
 
aExtent of Disclosure was rated on a 10-point scale where 1=minimal disclosure and 10=extensive disclosure. 
bAuditor Reporting Choice was varied at three levels, No CAM, Short CAM and Long CAM.  See Appendix B for 
excerpts for each condition. 
cAudit Committee Oversight Strength was varied at two levels, moderate and strong.  See Appendix A for excerpts 
for each condition. 
dParticipants rated how concerned they were that disclosing information about the warranty exposure issue would 
reveal proprietary information about the company to its competitors on a 7-point scale where 1 = Very little 
concerned and 7 = Very concerned. 
eContrast coefficients were -1 for Strong AC/No CAM, +5 for Strong AC/Long CAM,  -3 for Moderate AC/No 
CAM, and -1 for Moderate AC/Long CAM. 
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Table 4 – Rating of Extent of Disclosure – Comparison of Short CAM and Long CAM 
conditions 
Panel A: Mean (standard deviation) Ratings of Extent of Disclosurea by Audit Committee 
Oversight Strength and Auditor Reporting Choice 
 AUDITOR REPORTING CHOICEb  
Overall Short CAM Long CAM 
AUDIT 
COMMITTEE 
OVERSIGHT 
STRENGTHc 
 
STRONG 
 
6.79 
(1.72) 
n = 24 
8.08 
(1.62) 
n = 26 
7.46 
(1.78) 
n = 50 
 
MODERATE 
7.36 
(1.73) 
n = 25 
6.53 
(1.90) 
n = 19 
7.00 
(1.83) 
n = 44 
 
Overall  
7.08 
(1.73) 
n = 49 
7.42 
(1.89) 
n = 45 
 
 
Panel B: ANCOVA results for Ratings of Extent of Disclosure 
Source of Variation df SS F-Value p-value (1-
tailed 
Audit Committee Oversight Strength 
Auditor Reporting Choice 
Audit Committee Oversight Strength  X 
     Auditor Reporting Choice 
Covariate: 
      Proprietary Informationd 
1 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
5.855 
0.383 
 
28.913 
 
10.916 
2.009 
0.131 
 
9.921 
 
3.745 
.080 
.359 
 
.001 
 
.028 
 
Panel C: Planned Contrast for Test of Effect of Auditor Reporting Choice and Audit 
Committee Oversight Strength on Ratings of Extent of Disclosure 
 t-statistic p-value (1-tailed) 
Model contraste 2.066 .021 
 
aExtent of Disclosure was rated on a 10-point scale where 1=minimal disclosure and 10=extensive disclosure. 
bAuditor Reporting Choice was varied at three levels, No CAM, Short CAM and Long CAM.  See Appendix B for 
excerpts for each condition. 
cAudit Committee Oversight Strength was varied at two levels, moderate and strong.  See Appendix A for excerpts 
for each condition. 
dParticipants rated how concerned they were that disclosing information about the warranty exposure issue would 
reveal proprietary information about the company to its competitors on a 7-point scale where 1 = Very little 
concerned and 7 = Very concerned. 
eContrast coefficients were +1 for Strong AC/Short CAM, +4 for Strong AC/Long CAM,  -3 for Moderate AC/Short 
CAM, and -2 for Moderate AC/Long CAM. 
 
 52 
 
Table 5 – Rating of Extent of Disclosure – Comparison of No CAM and Short CAM 
conditions 
Panel A: Mean (standard deviation) Ratings of Extent of Disclosurea by Audit Committee 
Oversight Strength and Auditor Reporting Choice 
 AUDITOR REPORTING 
CHOICEb 
 
Overall 
No CAM Short CAM 
AUDIT 
COMMITTEE 
OVERSIGHT 
STRENGTHc 
 
STRONG 
 
6.95 
(1.76) 
n = 22 
6.79 
(1.72) 
n = 24 
6.87 
(1.72) 
n = 46 
 
MODERATE 
6.52 
(1.78) 
n = 25 
7.36 
(1.73) 
n = 25 
6.94 
(1.79) 
n = 50 
 
Overall  
6.72 
(1.77) 
n = 47 
7.08 
(1.73) 
n = 49 
 
 
Panel B: ANCOVA results for Ratings of Extent of Disclosure 
Source of Variation df SS F-Value p-value (2-
tailed) 
Audit Committee Oversight Strength 
Auditor Reporting Choice 
Audit Committee Oversight Strength  X 
     Auditor Reporting Choice 
Covariate: 
      Proprietary Informationd 
1 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
.086 
6.817 
 
8.115 
 
22.898 
.030 
2.404 
 
2.862 
 
8.076 
.862 
.124 
 
.094 
 
.006 
 
Panel C: Planned Contrast for Test of Effect of Auditor Reporting Choice and Audit 
Committee Oversight Strength on Ratings of Extent of Disclosure 
 t-statistic p-value (2-tailed) 
Model contraste -0.082 .935 
 
aExtent of Disclosure was rated on a 10-point scale where 1=minimal disclosure and 10=extensive disclosure. 
bAuditor Reporting Choice was varied at three levels, No CAM, Short CAM and Long CAM.  See Appendix B for 
excerpts for each condition. 
cAudit Committee Oversight Strength was varied at two levels, moderate and strong.  See Appendix A for excerpts 
for each condition. 
dParticipants rated how concerned they were that disclosing information about the warranty exposure issue would 
reveal proprietary information about the company to its competitors on a 7-point scale where 1 = Very little 
concerned and 7 = Very concerned. 
eContrast coefficients were +1 for Strong AC/No CAM, +4 for Strong AC/Short CAM,  -3 for Moderate AC/No 
CAM, and -2 for Moderate AC/Short CAM.  
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Table 6 – Summary of Disclosure Element Ratings – Comparison of all CAM conditions 
Disclosure Element AC Strength No 
CAM 
Short CAM Long 
CAM 
p-value of planned 
contrasth (1-tailed) 
FS Amounta Strong 7.55 7.56 8.15 .414 
Moderate 7.76 8.08 8.11 
 
Rangeb Strong 4.27 4.44 6.00 .082 
Moderate 4.68 4.68 4.84 
 
Rationalec Strong 4.32 4.36 5.69 .234 
Moderate 5.04 4.56 5.37 
     
Key Assumptiond Strong 4.14 4.28 6.27 .010 
Moderate 4.16 4.56 4.68 
     
Uncertaintye Strong 8.23 7.84 8.08 .432 
Moderate 7.84 8.40 8.05 
     
Sensitivityf Strong 5.00 4.24 6.25 .029 
Moderate 5.28 3.84 3.95 
     
Mean of Elementsg Strong 5.58 5.45 6.74 .036 
Moderate 5.79 5.69 5.83 
 
Each of the six elements were rated by participants based on the likelihood they would choose to disclose the 
element.  Ratings were given on a 10-point scale where 1 = Definitely Not Disclose and 10 = Definitely Disclose.  
aFS Amount - the amounts reported in the financial statements regarding the company’s warranty estimate. 
bRange - the range of the company’s warranty estimate. 
cRationale - the rationale for the recorded amount. 
dKey Assumption - a description of the key uncertain assumption in the warranty estimate. 
eUncertainty - a description of uncertainty in the estimate. 
fSensitivity - a sensitivity analysis of the warranty estimate based on movement in the key uncertain assumption. 
gMean of Elements – The mean of the preceding six disclosure elements. 
hContrast coefficients were -1 for Strong AC/No CAM, +2 for Strong AC/ Short CAM, +5 for Strong AC/Long 
CAM,  -3 for Moderate AC/No CAM, -2 for Moderate AC/ Short CAM, and -1 for Moderate AC/Long CAM. 
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Table 7 – Summary of Disclosure Element Ratings – Comparison of No CAM and Long 
CAM conditions 
Disclosure Element AC Strength No CAM Long CAM p-value of planned 
contrasth (1-tailed) 
FS Amounta Strong 7.55 8.15 .291 
Moderate 7.76 8.11 
 
Rangeb Strong 4.27 6.00 .052 
Moderate 4.68 4.84 
 
Rationalec Strong 4.32 5.69 .186 
Moderate 5.04 5.37 
     
Key Assumptiond Strong 4.14 6.27 .003 
Moderate 4.16 4.68 
     
Uncertaintye Strong 8.23 8.08 .418 
Moderate 7.84 8.05 
     
Sensitivityf Strong 5.00 6.25 .030 
Moderate 5.28 3.95 
     
Mean of Elementsg Strong 5.58 6.74 .016 
Moderate 5.79 5.83 
 
Each of the six elements were rated by participants based on the likelihood they would choose to disclose the 
element.  Ratings were given on a 10-point scale where 1 = Definitely Not Disclose and 10 = Definitely Disclose.  
aFS Amount - the amounts reported in the financial statements regarding the company’s warranty estimate. 
bRange - the range of the company’s warranty estimate. 
cRationale - the rationale for the recorded amount. 
dKey Assumption - a description of the key uncertain assumption in the warranty estimate. 
eUncertainty - a description of uncertainty in the estimate. 
fSensitivity - a sensitivity analysis of the warranty estimate based on movement in the key uncertain assumption. 
gMean of Elements – The mean of the preceding six disclosure elements. 
hContrast coefficients were -1 for Strong AC/No CAM, +5 for Strong AC/Long CAM,  -3 for Moderate AC/No 
CAM, and -1 for Moderate AC/Long CAM. 
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Table 8 – Summary of Disclosure Element Ratings – Comparison of Short CAM and Long 
CAM conditions 
Disclosure Element AC Strength Short CAM Long CAM p-value of planned 
contrasth (1-tailed) 
FS Amounta Strong 7.56 8.15 .463 
Moderate 8.08 8.11 
 
Rangeb Strong 4.44 6.00 .108 
Moderate 4.68 4.84 
 
Rationalec Strong 4.36 5.69 .237 
Moderate 4.56 5.37 
     
Key Assumptiond Strong 4.28 6.27 .032 
Moderate 4.56 4.68 
     
Uncertaintye Strong 7.84 8.08 .321 
Moderate 8.40 8.05 
     
Sensitivityf Strong 4.24 6.25 .002 
Moderate 3.84 3.95 
     
Mean of Elementsg Strong 5.45 6.74 .038 
Moderate 5.69 5.83 
 
Each of the six elements were rated by participants based on the likelihood they would choose to disclose the 
element.  Ratings were given on a 10-point scale where 1 = Definitely Not Disclose and 10 = Definitely Disclose.  
aFS Amount - the amounts reported in the financial statements regarding the company’s warranty estimate. 
bRange - the range of the company’s warranty estimate. 
cRationale - the rationale for the recorded amount. 
dKey Assumption - a description of the key uncertain assumption in the warranty estimate. 
eUncertainty - a description of uncertainty in the estimate. 
fSensitivity - a sensitivity analysis of the warranty estimate based on movement in the key uncertain assumption. 
gMean of Elements – The mean of the preceding six disclosure elements. 
hContrast coefficients were +1 for Strong AC/Short CAM, +4 for Strong AC/Long CAM,  -3 for Moderate AC/Short 
CAM, and -2 for Moderate AC/Long CAM. 
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Table 9 – Summary of Disclosure Element Ratings – Comparison of No CAM and Short 
CAM conditions 
Disclosure Element AC Strength No CAM Short CAM p-value of planned 
contrasth (2-tailed) 
FS Amounta Strong 7.55 7.56 .605 
Moderate 7.76 8.08 
 
Rangeb Strong 4.27 4.44 .715 
Moderate 4.68 4.68 
 
Rationalec Strong 4.32 4.36 .504 
Moderate 5.04 4.56 
     
Key Assumptiond Strong 4.14 4.28 .920 
Moderate 4.16 4.56 
     
Uncertaintye Strong 8.23 7.84 .788 
Moderate 7.84 8.40 
     
Sensitivityf Strong 5.00 4.24 .622 
Moderate 5.28 3.84 
     
Mean of Elementsg Strong 5.58 5.45 .505 
Moderate 5.79 5.69 
 
Each of the six elements were rated by participants based on the likelihood they would choose to disclose the 
element.  Ratings were given on a 10-point scale where 1 = Definitely Not Disclose and 10 = Definitely Disclose.  
aFS Amount - the amounts reported in the financial statements regarding the company’s warranty estimate. 
bRange - the range of the company’s warranty estimate. 
cRationale - the rationale for the recorded amount. 
dKey Assumption - a description of the key uncertain assumption in the warranty estimate. 
eUncertainty - a description of uncertainty in the estimate. 
fSensitivity - a sensitivity analysis of the warranty estimate based on movement in the key uncertain assumption. 
gMean of Elements – The mean of the preceding six disclosure elements. 
hContrast coefficients were +1 for Strong AC/No CAM, +4 for Strong AC/Short CAM,  -3 for Moderate AC/No 
CAM, and -2 for Moderate AC/Short CAM. 
 
  
